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Social Security is on an unsustainable path. With average life spans increasing, the working-age 
population is not growing fast enough to support the growing number of retirees at current benefit levels 
and tax rates. By sometime later this decade, according to the Social Security trustees, benefit payments 
will outstrip payroll tax revenue every year for the foreseeable future (Social Security Trustees 2009).1 
Benefit cuts, revenue enhancements, or some combination could return the system to balance. The 
arithmetic is fairly straightforward, but the impact on future retirees depends crucially on how we cut 
benefits or increase revenues. 
 
 This factsheet shows the distributional effects of some benefit-cut and revenue-enhancement 
options on future retirees (see table 1, next page). Benefit cuts include reducing cost-of-living adjustments 
(COLAs), increasing Social Security’s full retirement age (FRA), and curbing growth in benefits by 
relating future payouts to price rather than wage changes. Revenue enhancements include increasing the 
Social Security payroll tax rate and the earnings base subject to the payroll tax. These policy options are 
not necessarily better than others and represent only a small portion of the full range of possible reforms. 
We chose them to illustrate how the distributional consequences of Social Security reform depend on the 
option policymakers pursue to restore system solvency.  
 
 Results are based on DYNASIM3, the Urban Institute’s dynamic microsimulation model.2 For 
each benefit reduction option, we show the impact on average benefits in 2030 and 2050 by age and 
lifetime earnings. We also take a lifetime perspective, showing for each option the effect on payout (the 
ratio of lifetime benefits to contributions) by lifetime earnings.  
 
 
Effects on Social Security Solvency 
 
• The COLA cut and the PPI proposal would both substantially reduce Social Security’s 75-year 
deficit (figure 1).3 Increasing the FRA to 68 would have a much smaller impact (although 
increasing the FRA further or indexing it to increases in longevity would lead to more savings). 
• Raising the payroll tax rate would eliminate about half of the 75-year deficit. Raising the taxable 
earnings cap would eliminate a smaller fraction. These effects are sensitive to economic 
conditions. (Savings would be greater for options that imposed steeper increases or that increased 
taxes on higher earners without allowing them to accrue additional benefits.) 
• Because the savings from each proposal differ so much, we focus on relative changes across age 
and earnings groups, not absolute differences in benefit receipt and ratio of benefits to 
contributions.  
• When different payroll tax and benefit provisions are combined, their effects do not necessarily 
add together because some provisions may interact with each other.  
                                                 
1 Payroll tax revenues already fall short of benefits in 2010 because high unemployment is depressing tax receipts, 
but they will likely exceed benefits again for a few years once the economy recovers. 
 
2 For more information on DYNASIM3, see Favreault and Smith (2004). 
 
3 Congressional Budget Office projections of these effects differ from Social Security Administration projections 
reported in the figure. 
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Table 1. Simulated Policy Options  
Benefit Cuts Description 
(1) Reduce COLAs Current law: Once benefits begin, they increase each year by the change in the 
consumer price index (CPI). 
Option: Reduce COLAs by 1 percentage point each year, starting in 2010. 
Rationale: Some evidence suggests that the CPI overstates true price hikes.  
(2) Increase the FRA Current law: FRA is 66 for those age 62 today and will increase to 67 beginning with 
those turning age 62 in 2022. 
Option: Gradually increase FRA beginning in 2010 until it reaches 68 for those turning 
62 in 2022 and later. 
Rationale: Longevity gains are increasing lifetime benefit payouts. 
(3) Switch to progressive 
price indexing (PPI) 
Current law: Initial benefits are tied to changes in the average wage, so that benefits 
replace roughly the same share of earnings for each generation.  
Option: Tie benefit growth to the change in prices instead of wages, but maintain 
wage-indexed benefits for retirees with low lifetime earnings (bottom 30 percent of the 
distribution), beginning with those turning age 62 in 2012. 
Rationale: The growth in real benefits would slow over time, but the system would 
move away from its traditional role of replacing earnings in retirement; real benefits 
would continue to grow for retirees with limited lifetime earnings. 
Revenue Increases  
(1) Increase taxable 
maximum 
Current law: Contributions and future benefits are based only on earnings that fall 
below an annual cap that currently covers about 84 percent of all earnings. 
Option: Increase the taxable maximum to cover 90 percent of all earnings, effective in 
2010; count these additional contributions toward benefits. 
Rationale: The share of earnings covered by the cap has fallen over time; increasing it 
would raise revenues more than benefits because the benefit formula is progressive. 
(2) Increase payroll tax rate Current law: Social Security’s payroll tax is currently 12.4 percent, split equally 
between workers and employers. 
Option: Increase the payroll tax by 1 percentage point, effective in 2010. 
 
Figure 1.  Percent Reduction in the 75-Year Social Security Deficit 
under Selected Policy Changes 
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Source: Office of the Chief Actuary, Social Security Administration, based on 2009 trustees' assumptions, plus Urban Institute calculations.  
Phase-in provisions differ modestly from the options simulated here, so their costs would differ. 
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Distributional Impact of Benefit Cuts 
 
We show how the impact of each benefit reduction option on benefits received in 2030 and 2050 (relative 
to benefits scheduled under current law) varies by the age and lifetime earnings of beneficiaries. Because 
the full effect of some options do not become apparent for decades, it is important to examine long-run 
outcomes. If current law continues without any reforms, scheduled benefits in 2050 will exceed system 
revenues, allowing Social Security to pay only 76 percent of scheduled benefits. 
Figure 2. Benefit Reduction by Age, 2030
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Source:  The Urban Institute Retirement Policy Program, based on DYNASIM3 (run 614, April 2009, using 2008 trustees' assumptions).
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Age Differences 
• Reducing COLAs would hit the oldest beneficiaries hardest (figure 2), because cuts cumulate 
over time. However, benefits would also fall substantially for disabled beneficiaries age 50 to 61, 
many of whom have been receiving payments for many years.  
• The COLA reduction would cut benefits for the oldest beneficiaries more in 2050 than 2030 
because virtually no one would have experienced the higher COLA in effect before 2010 (figure 
3). For beneficiaries age 80 and older, benefit cuts under the COLA reduction would exceed the 
across-the-board cuts they would experience if current law continued without any reforms.  
Figure 3. Benefit Reduction by Lifetime Earnings, 2030
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Source: The Urban Institute Retirement Policy Program, based on DYNASIM3 (run 614, April 2009, using 2008 trustees' assumptions).
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• Increasing the FRA would not reduce payments to disabled beneficiaries. The impact on retirees 
age 80 and older would be very small in 2030 because they would have reached age 62 before 
2010, when the changes would first go into effect. The impact would be larger in 2050. 
• Increasing the FRA to 68 would most reduce payments to beneficiaries age 65 to 69, because it 
would subject more beneficiaries in that age range to the retirement earnings test (RET). The RET 
reduces payments to employed beneficiaries younger than the FRA who earn more than a certain 
amount. However, payments to beneficiaries subject to the RET generally increase once they stop 
working, fully offsetting the loss in benefits. 
• The PPI proposal would not affect the oldest beneficiaries in 2030 who turned 62 after 2012, 
when the changes would go into effect. By 2050, however, the impacts would be sizeable.  
Figure 4. Benefit Reduction by Age, 2050
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Source: The Urban Institute Retirement Policy Program, based on DYNASIM3 (run 614, April 2009, using 2008 trustees' assumptions).
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Earnings Differences 
• The effects of COLA reductions would not differ much by earnings (figures 4 and 5). 
• Benefit reductions from an increase in the FRA would increase with lifetime earnings, primarily 
because FRA increases exempt disabled workers, who on average have lower lifetime earnings. 
The temporary RET reductions also play a role. 
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Figure 5. Benefit Reduction by Lifetime Earnings, 2050
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• In 2050, the PPI proposal would reduce benefits substantially for beneficiaries in the top three-
fifths of the lifetime earnings distribution, but those in the bottom fifth would experience only 
modest cuts. (We classify beneficiaries on the basis of shared family earnings, whereas the PPI 
proposal would use individual earnings. As a result, benefits would fall for some beneficiaries 
who are in the bottom quintile of family earnings but not in the bottom 30 percent of individual 
earnings.) 
 
Distributional Impact on Ratio of Benefits to Contributions 
 
It is important to examine the impact of policy changes over a lifetime, not just in a single year. Figures 6 
and 7 show how the ratio of lifetime benefits to lifetime contributions varies by lifetime earnings for each 
policy option. The estimates are for workers born 1965 to 1972 (and age 38 to 45 in 2010). 
• Under current law, Social Security is quite progressive. Workers with low lifetime earnings 
receive benefits that substantially exceed their contributions. Workers in the second and third 
quintiles also earn sizeable returns from the system. However, workers in the top fifth of the 
earnings distribution pay more in taxes than they receive in benefits.  
• Each benefit reduction policy option reduces the returns workers receive on their contributions 
but maintains the system’s overall progressivity. The PPI proposal would boost overall 
progressivity because it would maintain current-law benefits for workers with the lowest lifetime 
earnings, though at the cost of markedly reduced replacement rates for many higher earners.  
• Similarly, increasing the taxable maximum and raising the raising the payroll tax rate would cut 
returns but not substantially change the system’s progressivity for those born 1965 to 1972. 
(Increased progressivity is more apparent for the taxable maximum option when we examine 
earnings deciles rather than quintiles.) 
 
We chose to show results for this generation because they would experience many of these Social 
Security changes for a significant part of their career. Policymakers should also compare these ratios for 
other generations, especially for proposals that direct greater fractions of tax and benefit changes to future 
generations of workers (such as some price indexing proposals and payroll tax proposals that phase in 
over the next few decades, rather than immediately).  Examining other outcomes, such as those to 
poverty, is also useful. 
Figure 6.  Returns under Benefit Reduction Policy Options by Lifetime Earnings, 
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Source: The Urban Institute Retirement Policy Program, based on DYNASIM3 (run 614, April 2009, using 2008 trustees' assumptions).
Note: Estimates assume a 2 percent real interest rate.
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Figure 7.  Returns under Revenue Enhancement Policy Options by Lifetime Earnings, 
1965-72 Birth Cohort 
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Source: The Urban Institute Retirement Policy Program, based on DYNASIM3 (run 614v2, April 2010, using 2008 trustees' assumptions).
 
 
Conclusions 
 
Social Security benefit cuts and revenue-raising options have different effects on workers in different 
generations, age groups, and with different lifetime earnings. The devil really is in the details. We 
simulate only a few of the prominent options that have been discussed in the past. The effects shown 
could be reduced by phasing in the changes more gradually. Combinations of benefit reductions and 
revenue options could be designed to spread the effects across different groups in various ways. Also, 
these options could be combined with new ideas to protect the most vulnerable, such as new minimum 
benefit options (Favreault, Mermin, and Steuerle 2007). 
 
 
For more information, visit “How Could We Reform Social Security?” on our website 
(http://www.urban.org/retirement_policy/reform.cfm.) 
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